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Abstract
Mark-up pricing, much discussed in the 1940s, led Grant and Quiggin (1994) to study
Nash mark-up equilibria as alternatives to Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly equilibria. Mark-
up models are increasingly used in modelling complex markets, where agent-based modelling is
an attractive way of finding equilibria. While such learning behaviour can converge to a Nash
equilibrium, that does not establish that the equilibrium is robust against more sophisticated
strategy choices. This paper examines two particular forms of agent-based models commonly
used in electricity market modelling and demonstrates that they are robust to single firm
Nash Cournot deviations but not against more sophisticated deviations.
Keywords: mark-up equilibria, stability, oligopoly, agent-based modelling, learning
JEL Classification: C63, C73, D43, L10, L13, L94
1 Introduction
Empirical industry studies in the 1940’s were concerned with the apparent mismatch between
the theory of profit maximization and the evidence that managers had little if any concept of
marginal cost and revenue. Instead they followed rules of thumb in setting prices at a mark-up
over average cost (Hall and Hitch, 1939). As Grant and Quiggin (1994) observed, this led to a
methodological debate in which Friedman (1953) argued that managers could be following rules
∗Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Imperial College London; contact address: Faculty of
Economics, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge UK CB3 9DE; email: dmgn@cam.ac.uk. This is an extension of Newbery
(2012), which has an error in that what were labelled Stackelberg equilibria were Nash equilibria. We are indebted
to Rich Gilbert, Robert Ritz and Marta Rocha for comments, and to earlier referees, but remaining errors are ours
alone.
†EPRG, Cambridge; contact address: Faculty of Economics, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge UK CB3 9DE; email:
tg336@cam.ac.uk.
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of thumb but still be pushed towards profit-maximizing behaviour, as those who chose non profit-
maximizing mark-ups would earn lower profits and lose market share and/or exit. Grant and
Quiggin further argued that this argument does not immediately apply to oligopolistic markets
in which managers need to anticipate how their rivals will respond to their actions. If other firms
were choosing mark-ups on costs, then this would aﬀect the choice of a profit maximizing firm.
Grant and Quiggin (1994) examined the case in which each firm chose its profit-maximizing
mark-up over marginal cost (in their model equivalent to choosing a mark-up over average cost)
instead of choosing the optimal output level. This relates firms’ actions more closely to what
they observe, but they are still assumed to set the mark-up where marginal cost is equal to
marginal residual revenue (although their opening remarks suggest that firms actually adjust
their mark-ups in response to market conditions and so grope towards this profit-maximizing
position, in the spirt of Friedman’s defence). An alternative approach is take the observation that
managers lack full information about their competitive environment more seriously, and explore
the consequences of imperfect information. One approach has been to explore the consequences of
imperfectly observing the actions of their rivals but nevertheless having otherwise full information
about the consequences of any set of actions by the players. Bagwell (1995) explores one-shot
Stackelberg games to disentangle the implications of the two standard assumptions - that one
agent can move first, and that all other agents perfectly observe her choice. He claimed that
the first-mover advantage is eliminated if there is even a slight amount of noise in observing
the leader’s choice. van Damme and Hurkens (1997) criticized this conclusion by noting that it
depended on restricting choices to pure strategy equilibria, and that Bagwell’s game always had
mixed strategy equilibria close to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the noise was small. Their
paper contains an extensive discussion of equilibrium selection, but remains firmly within the
standard game-theoretic approach.
An alternative approach is to suppose that the information available to firms is limited to
their own costs and market outcomes, which they can observe in a sequence of choices by all
the firms. Again there are several ways this can be modelled, depending on what firms can
observe. A number of papers have assumed that firms can observe the actions and subsequent
profits earned by their rivals, so that they can imitate their behaviour. Vega-Redondo (1997)
explores the classic Cournot setting of a market of quantity-setting firms producing a homogenous
output in which firms experiment with a diﬀerent level of output with a -(small) probability,
and successful firms win out over less successful firms, as Friedman (1953) argued. He concludes
that the final resting place of this stochastic dynamic process was the unique Walrasian (i.e.
perfectly competitive) outcome. This approach was extended by Schipper (2009), who allowed
firms either to imitate the output choices of the most profitable firms, or to optimize against
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the other firms, but with all firms making small mistakes. This time the long-run state is one
in which imitators are better oﬀ than optimizers. A subsequent paper by Duersch, Oechssler,
and Schipper (2012) extends this idea, which was prompted by observing experimental subjects
playing a Cournot duopoly against a computer programmed with a variety of learning algorithms.
The computer could easily be beaten, except when it followed the rule of copying the action of
the most successful player in the previous round.
Schipper and his colleagues assume that all firms can identify both the actions and the
resulting profits of their rivals, while Vega-Redondo adopts a more Darwinian approach in that
exit or death is more likely with lower profits. But in a world of strategic rivalry, firms may
go to considerable lengths to conceal both profits resulting from specific actions and the actions
themselves, and with imperfect competition they may be able to survive without necessarily
maximizing profits. Such a world can be explored through agent-based modelling. In such
models, agents learn by testing out deviations from past strategy choices to see if they can
increase profits, and continue to experiment until further improvements can no longer be found.
The model must specify exactly what can and cannot be observed, and in many cases this is
restricted to information about the firm’s profit and his past choices (which can be computed
from past outputs, the cost function and the associated market prices). As such the information
is even more imperfect than normally assumed in formal game-theoretic studies, but may avoid
some of the evident sensitivities of such studies to the precise form of the information assumed.
Agent-based modelling is widely used for markets characterized by complexities, such as
electricity markets, which frequently exhibit market power and where the market design and
transmission constraints can make it hard to find analytic solutions and hence characterize equi-
librium solutions as functions of underlying parameters. It is therefore attractive to adopt an
agent-based modelling strategy that can handle such complexity. Weidlich and Veit (2008) give
an excellent survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models and compare diﬀerent
learning strategies and their results. The aim of this paper is to explore the robustness of these
models to more sophisticated behaviour by firms to see if they can benefit by choosing a diﬀerent
strategy than just marking up on marginal cost. The implications of finding that the stan-
dard modelling approaches are indeed vulnerable to such deviations is that agent-based models
should test any proposed long-run equilibrium against such deviations, and we identify the kind
of deviations that are most likely to disturb such equilibria.
2 Learning and mark-up models
Learning can be modelled in several ways: evolutionary learning, reinforcement learning, belief
learning, experience-weighted attraction, among others (see Camerer, 2003). Reinforcement and
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belief learning are two of the most important approaches in individual learning modeling. The
latter assumes that players update their beliefs based on past history, whereas the former makes
fewer assumptions about the information available to an agent and their cognitive ability. As
such, they make concrete the psychological idea of bounded rationality. Reinforcement learning
models have been studied in economics (e.g. Roth and Erev, 1995) and in the artificial intelligence
literature (e.g. Sutton and Barto, 1998). Q-learning1 is a reinforcement learning model originally
developed in the field of artificial intelligence (Watkins, 1989). An agent using a Q-learning
algorithm keeps in memory a Q-value function of the weighted average of the payoﬀs obtained
by playing a certain action in the past. The agent then plays with high probability the action
that gives the highest payoﬀ and with a small probability a randomly chosen diﬀerent action (to
test that any optimum found is not just a local maximum), observes the payoﬀ it obtains and
then updates its Q-value (Krause et al., 2006; Waltman and Kaymak, 2008).
One such formulation has agents choosing a mark-up on their marginal cost schedule, the
natural counterpart to the approach of Grant and Quiggin (Krause et al., 2006). A key question
facing such modelers is whether the resulting equilibrium is indeed a Nash equilibrium (where
that is unique) in the space of actions allowed in the formulation of the game, and indeed what
happens where there are multiple Nash equilibria. This is the question that Krause et al. (2006)
address in the context of a simplified electricity market, and answer aﬃrmatively for unique
Nash equilibria. Models in which agents choose mark-ups on marginal costs are popular among
agent-based models of electricity markets where generators are acutely aware of their marginal
(primarily fuel) operating costs when submitting their daily oﬀers into the wholesale and/or
balancing markets, and most of the examples surveyed in Weidlich and Veit (2008) have this
form.
There are good reasons for studying mark-up models in complex markets, such as electricity
wholesale and balancing markets. Standard oligopoly models consider actions to be either quan-
tities (supplies to the market), as in the Cournot formulation, or prices oﬀered to the market
(the Bertrand assumption). In the presence of uncertain or varying demand that are character-
istic of electricity markets, supply function models, developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
and applied to electricity markets by Green and Newbery (1992), are attractive intermediate
formulations. In particular, their linear solutions have been influential in motivating the kind of
agent-based models considered here. In the simple quadratic cost, linear demand model there
are two simple types of deviation from competitive bidding - marking-up the oﬀer schedule by
a constant amount, or changing the slope of the oﬀer schedule, as in Hobbs et al. (2000). If
1 set out in Watkins (1989) and further developed by Littman (1994) and Hu and Wellman (2003), and critically
compared to other reinforcement learning models in Weidlich and Veit (2008).
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marginal costs are linear, then there is a supply function equilibrium which is a slope mark-up
on the marginal cost, and this solution has been widely used in simple analytical models (e.g.
Green, 1999).2
Given their prevalence in modelling electricity markets, it is clearly timely to examine the
robustness of such models. The obvious problem with agent-based modelling, where agents are
assumed to learn about the profit consequences of their choices and then adapt these choices to
increase profits, is that the action space over which they make choices may be too restrictive
and may allow other more sophisticated agents to exploit this type of learning. A good defence
of adaptive learning would be to show that the equilibrium of the form of learning were robust
against more sophisticated players choosing from a wider set of actions. It is the purpose of this
paper to explore the conditions under which this is the case and when not.
Note that this concept of robustness diﬀers from the normal concept of stability in Nash
games, which has a long history, summarized in e.g. Okuguchi and Yamazaki (2009). That paper
establishes that under the generalized Hahn condition,3 if a game has a unique Nash equilibrium,
then it is globally stable. Stability here means that all players choose strategies from the same
strategy set (e.g. outputs, or prices, or mark-ups) and adjust their response in the direction
that increases profits. It is extremely useful for defending the study of the Nash equilibrium,
as agents will converge on this equilibrium as they adjust their choices to increase profits. In
contrast, this paper is concerned with a wider sense of stability or robustness in which there is
no temptation for any agent or subset of agents to choose a strategy from a wider strategy set
once the Nash equilibrium has been attained.4 Even here, there are delicacies in describing the
interactions between the players.
Agent-based models typically prescribe rules of behaviour that lead the agents to adjust
their decision variables in the light of the outcome of the previous period’s interactions. In the
standard formulation all agents of the same type - for example, generators in electricity markets
- would follow the same behavioural rules. A first test of robustness is against deviations by a
player choosing actions from a wider strategy set than the remaining players, but otherwise taking
the actions of the other players as given (i.e. the game remains Nash). We show that a unique
deterministic Nash equilibrium is necessarily robust to single firm deviations, but demonstrate
2With finite support to the distribution of demand and no capacity limits as here, there will be a continuum
of supply function equilibria, of which one is the linear supply function, which is the optimal response of any firm
provided all other firms have chosen that supply function.
3The generalised Hahn condition (after Hahn, 1962) holds if the payoﬀ to player  can be written as ()
where  is the strategy choice and  = , and when ( ) ≡  + , then   0 and
 ≤ 0 for all feasible strategies and all .
4Simulation models that used Q-learning have shown that agents can learn to collude (Waltman and Kaymak,
2008) but in this paper we only explore incentives on smaller subsets of firms to follow diﬀerent strategy choices.
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that in the class of models considered here, not to collective deviations. A more stringent
requirement is that a sophisticated player acting as a Stackelberg leader cannot profitably commit
to a diﬀerent strategy than the followers, anticipating and taking account of the response of these
naive followers, who mechanically choose actions from their limited strategy set but adapt to the
leader’s choices. We show that the various mark-up models considered are not robust against
such deviations.
The next section sets out the model and derives benchmark solutions for the linear-quadratic
case, chosen as this has a well-defined slope and for which it is simple to define a slope mark-up.5
Although demand and cost functions are assumed non-stochastic, the need to model behaviour
as learning is motivated by the imperfect knowledge agents have about the shape of the demand
schedule and the choices of their competitors - all they observe are the ex post price realisations.
Section 3 then considers the two mark-up models and examines their robustness against the first
type of Nash-Cournot deviation, demonstrating their robustness against single firm deviations
but not to multi-firm deviations. Section 4 then constructs a counter-example for beneficial
deviation by a single firm in the duopoly case in which a sophisticated leader plays a Stackelberg
strategy - in this case by she can profitably commit to an inelastic output level or slope that
diﬀers from the mark-up chosen by the more naive follower.
3 The market model
Consider a market of  identical firms,  = 1  producing a non-storable homogenous output
(electricity providing an excellent example), each with cost function () = + 122 . Without
loss of generality set  = 0 by measuring prices relative to the level . The marginal cost, MC,
is  which gives an aggregate competitive linear supply schedule  independent of . The
natural demand formulation in a linear model has linear demand,() = − so  = (−).
The inverse slope parameter can be set at  = 1 by a suitable choice of price units. The perfectly
competitive solution is  = MC = , with
 = 
(1 + )   =

(1 + )  (1)
In the constant marginal cost case,  = 0,  = 0 but otherwise if   0 the average (short-run)
cost is half the price  (both relative to the price level normalization, ).6
5Grant and Quiggen (1994) consider a model with constant elasticities of supply and demand, and just a mark-
up on average or marginal costs, but this does not allow any simple extension to marking up the slope of the firm’s
supply schedule.
6 In the long run the average cost could be constant, with the location of the short-run cost curve depending
on, e.g. capacity, as in McAfee, Preston and Williams (1992), Grant and Quiggen (1996), or Akgün (2004), with
the short-run profits covering the fixed capital costs.
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3.1 Nash-Cournot oligopoly
Now consider the Nash-Cournot solution in which each identical firm takes the output decisions
of the others, − = P 6=  , as given, and chooses  to maximize profit, (−) = ( +
−) − (). The first order condition (f.o.c.) gives the reaction function
 = (−−)(2 + ) (2)
so the symmetric oligopoly solution is
 = (
1 + )
(1 + + 1)
   = (1 + ) + 1   (3)
Note that as  → ∞, so  → , and that in the constant marginal cost case,  = (1 + ),
which is strictly positive.
3.2 The robustness of competitive and Cournot equilibrium
As this paper is concerned to examine the robustness of various equilibrium concepts, the logical
place to start is with an exploration of the competitive equilibrium described above. In the -
firm case, would it be advantageous for one firm to choose a quantity diﬀerent from that implied
by oﬀering to supply at its marginal cost, MC? The answer is clearly yes, as the supply of the
remaining  − 1 firms can be subtracted from total demand to give a downward-sloping (and
hence well-behaved) residual demand facing the firm, who will then choose output such that MC
equals marginal revenue (MR), which will be below price, and hence output would be restricted as
in the Nash Cournot case. The appendix provides the algebraic proof and demonstrates that the
deviant chooses the same output as if he were in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, but providing the
residual demand is well-behaved so that profit is indeed maximized when the first order condition
is satisfied (i.e. MC = MR), this verbal argument is suﬃcient. However, the Cournot deviant
raises the price for all other price-taking firms, who, as they outproduce the deviant, will make
higher profits than the deviant, raising the question whether firms would defect from a Cournot
oligopoly to become price takers. This is the situation examined by Duersch et al. (2012), who
argued that copying the actions of the most successful firm (in this case the price-takers) would
lead to a competitive outcome.
More precisely, starting from the -firm Cournot oligopoly described in (3), would it pay
 ≥ 1 firms to deviate to become price-taking competitive firms and setting output where MC
equals price, or at  = ()? The residual demand facing the remaining − Cournot players
will be given from  = − (− ) − () or
 = − (−  − 1) −   =  +  
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where  is the output choice facing any of the remaining Cournot firms and the output of each
other Cournot firm, , is taken as given. The reaction function is now  = (−(−−1))(2+
 + ) and the solution for  =  is exactly as in (3). However, the price is now
 = (+ 1 + )
(1 + (1 + ))(1 + )
 
 = (+ 1 + )( 1 + (1 + ))(+ )
=  (+ 1 + )
(+ )  
Clearly as the deviant receives the same price as the Cournot firms, he makes more profit than
the other Cournot firms and might seem to find it more attractive to act competitively than
stay with the oligopolists. However, the profit the deviant makes as a competitor facing  − 1
other competitive firms and −  Cournot firms is less than the profit he would make as one of
−  + 1 Cournot firms facing  − 1 competitive firms, so there is no advantage in deviating.7
4 Reinforcement or Q-learning
Under Q-learning, each firm selects a specified type of deviation from competitive bidding, and
will continue to adjust the size of the deviation until the resulting market outcome is stationary
and it is not profitable to make further adjustments. If there is a unique Nash equilibrium, this
process should converge to that equilibrium. In the simple quadratic cost, linear demand model
there are two simple types of deviation from competitive bidding: marking-up the oﬀer schedule
by a constant amount, or changing the slope of the oﬀer schedule.
4.1 Q-learning with a constant mark-up
Suppose each firm oﬀers its supply at a mark-up above marginal cost, MC,8 so its oﬀer price  =
MC +, (so − MC = ). As MC =  = −, the supply schedule in price space is
 = (−)  ( = 1    ) (4)
Under the mark-up form of Q-learning firm  keeps adjusting its mark-up to improve its profit.
The Nash equilibrium in this “multi-agent system” is a set of mark-ups  that maximize each
firm ’s profit, assuming the other firms choose their mark-up independently (the vector of other
mark-ups, m− is thus treated as fixed). The market clearing price, MCP, (m−) is the
price at which demand equals aggregate supply, found by summing over the  from (4). The
7This is most simply demonstrated numerically by varying ,  and . Algebraic demonstration is tedious and
unecessary.
8 In this case the choice of marking up over MC gives a diﬀerent equilibrium price to marking up over average
cost, but producers are often more aware of variable costs than average total cost, so this is not a decisive criticism.
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profit maximizing first order conditions (f.o.c.) give the  reaction functions for the mark-ups
(derivations are provided in the appendix):
(2(1 + )2 − 1) = +
X
 6=
   = 1 
The symmetric solution is therefore
 = (1 + )2 − 1  (5)
 = (1 + ) = (1 + )
(1 + )2 − 1
 (6)
 = (−) =
(1 + − 1)
(1 + )2 − 1  (7)
In the constant returns case in which  = 0, the Nash equilibrium is the competitive price,
 = 0, in contrast to the Nash-Cournot case, suggesting the competition in mark-ups is more
competitive than competition in quantities. As with Nash-Cournot, as  → ∞  → .
Proposition 1 establishes that the mark-up equilibrium is always more competitive than the
Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The symmetric Nash-Cournot oligopoly solution with linear demand and equal
quadratic costs always has a higher equilibrium price than the Nash equilibrium in which firms
choose their mark-up on marginal cost.
Proof Evaluate
 −  = (1 + )(1 + ) + 1 −
(1 + )
(1 + )2 − 1 
Sign( − ) ∝ (1 + )((1 + )2 − 1)− (1 + )((1 + ) + 1)
= − 1  0
QED.
This confirms for the linear case Grant and Quiggen’s (1994) finding for the constant elastic
supply and demand case where competition in average mark-ups (in their model equivalent to
competition in mark-ups on marginal cost) leads to more competitive outcomes than the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium. It also suggests that a sophisticated firm observing other firms following
a mark-up strategy might prefer to play a Cournot strategy in order to increase profits, in
which case the mark-up equilibrium, once reached, would be vulnerable to deviations. That
was certainly the case where the other players were behaving competitively, but the competitive
equilibrium with a finite number of firms is not a Nash equilibrium, and provided only one firm
considers deviating by choosing output rather than a mark-up, and moves simultaneously with
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the remaining firms, the equilibrium remains (in a sense to be defined) a Nash equilibrium and
the deviant secures no advantage. This can be illustrated intuitively and argued formally in what
follows.
4.2 Q-learning with a choice of slope
Suppose instead of choosing a mark-up on the linear MC schedule, whose slope is , firms
choose a linear oﬀer schedule which is increasingly above the true MC schedule (in quantity
space). Their supply schedule in price space can be written as
 =    = 1  (8)
instead of (4), where lower values of  indicate higher mark-ups (and again in the symmetric case
aggregate supply will be independent of ). Aggregate demand equals supply gives the MCP,
( s−):
−  =  1
X    = 
1 + 1
P  
Diﬀerentiating the profit function ( s−) = ( s−)( s−) − () partially w.r.t. 
(details in the appendix) gives the reaction function:
 = +
P
 6= 
1 + (+P 6= )   = 1 
The symmetric equilibrium solves
0 = (− 1)2 − (− − 2)−  (9)
 = − − 2 + 
2(− 1)  where  =
p
(− 2)2 + 2(+ 2) (10)
 = 2(− 1)
(1 + )(− 2) +    =

(1 + )  (11)
In the constant returns case in which  = 0  = 0, as with the mark-up case, but with a positive
slope prices will be above the competitive solution. In the limit as  → ∞  → 1+ , the
competitive (and Nash-Cournot) limit. Proposition 3 shows that the slope mark-up equilibrium
is more competitive than the Nash Cournot equilibrium but less competitive than the mark-up
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In a Nash game, if players assume that the strategy space is the choice of the
slope of its oﬀer schedule, then with a quadratic cost function, linear demand and identical
players, the equilibrium yields a price that lies between the Nash-Cournot and the Nash mark-up
price, and hence yields higher profits than choosing the best mark-up over marginal costs.
Proof. Given in the appendix.
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4.3 Cournot deviations from mark-up equilibria
Figure 1 shows the result of the deviant, , choosing output when the remaining firms choose to
mark-up on marginal cost. The supply schedule of these firms from (4) is  = (−)(). The
− 1 firms’ collective supply is then subtracted from total demand to give the residual demand
at price  as shown in Figure 1 and given by
() = ()− (− 1) = (− )− (− 1)(−) ≡ −  (12)
where  = + (1− 1) ,  = 1 + (1− 1). The deviant’s optimal response is to choose  to
maximize profit,  − (), where  = (− ). The question to address is whether choos-
ing the Nash mark-up given in (5) is robust against a player optimizing against this strategy.
Proposition 2 shows, as the figure clearly demonstrates, that the answer is yes.
Mark-up vs Cournot Nash Equilibria
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Proposition 3 In a deterministic Nash game, if players assume that the strategy space is the
choice of the mark-up on its marginal cost or the slope of the supply schedule, then that player
will maximize her profits regardless of whether another player chooses the same strategy choice
as other players (mark-up on marginal cost or the slope of the supply schedule) or an optimal
quantity to supply, and hence the Nash mark-up/slope equilibria are robust against Cournot
deviations.
Proof. Each firm faces the same residual demand schedule and will choose the same optimal
output whether they choose the optimal mark-up, the optimal slope, or the optimal quantity (or
11
any other choice variable such as price) that corresponds to MC set equal to the marginal residual
demand revenue. QED.
Thus the Nash equilibrium behaviour in mark-ups or slopes is robust against a Nash-Cournot
deviant who can choose from a broader set of strategies that also includes quantities, at least in
a deterministic setting. Figure 2 illustrates this for the case in which all but the deviant firm
choose their supply slopes.
Slope mark-up vs Cournot Nash equilibria
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On reflection, this should not be surprising, as once the other firms have chosen their optimal
mark-up (or slope) given the residual demand they assume faces them, the deviant faces the same
residual demand and hence chooses the same mark-up, which is where the residual marginal
revenue meets MC, shown in Figures 1 and 2. One might reasonably argue that the resulting
outcome is no longer a true Nash equilibrium, in that while the deviant firm correctly predicts
what the other firms will do, these mark-up firms are not correctly predicting what strategy the
deviant is following and hence not correctly predicting the residual demand they face, although
they are predicting the mark-up she will actually choose. We will explore this further in section
4. It is also important to note that although the equilibrium is robust to deviations, the resulting
price depends on the strategy space, in this case mark-ups or supply slopes rather than quantities
(and is lower as a result). Note that the argument does not depend on linearity of demand or
marginal cost and is a direct consequence of Nash behaviour in a deterministic setting.
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4.4 Multi-firm deviations
Suppose that  firms decide to play a Cournot strategy, knowing that − firms will continue with
their mark-up strategies but the other deviants will choose the same output as the first deviant
(but independently, each taking the other’s output as given). The market clearing condition is
 = −  − ( − 1) − − (−) or
 = −  − ( − 1) + (− ) 

 = −
1
   = 1 + (1−

)
where  is the output of the each other Cournot deviant, taken as given, and  is the output
choice to be made. As before the f.o.c. for the deviant is given by  = MC − or
 =  +  = −  − ( − 1) + (− ) 
Set  =  and substitute for  to give
( + 1 + ) = 
2(1 + )2 − 
2(1 + )2 − 
 = −  + (− )2(1 + )2 − 
As a numerical example, let  = 5,  = 2  = 1,  = 100, so that the symmetric mark-up
equilibrium has  = 995 = 947,  = 526. The deviants’ output will be 981045 = 9378
which is smaller, so the equilibrium will be diﬀerent. The price will be  = 528 and so the profit
of a deviating firm rather than conforming to the original strategy will be 2748 rather than
2742, or 022% higher. Thus there is a (small) incentive for a subset of more than one (very)
sophisticated firms to deviate from a Nash mark-up equilibrium.
5 Robustness to Stackelberg deviations
Although a single deviant was unable to improve on her profits by choosing quantities rather
than mark-ups, knowing that the remaining firms were acting on the (mistaken) assumption that
all firms were choosing their mark-up facing the same residual demand schedule, there remains
a question whether this is a consistently formulated equilibrium. If all firms observe is the
consequences of their choices in the market price, then they are correctly choosing the optimal
choice of mark-up (or output). If they are basing their choice of mark-up on assumptions about
the shape of the residual demand they face then the assumed residual demand will be incorrect
in the face of a Cournot deviant. One way round this inconsistency is to suppose that the deviant
firm’s strategy choice is known to the remaining firms, who nevertheless continue to choose their
mark-up (and similarly the deviant knows that the other firms will behave that way). In a
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learning context, this would require the leader to stick to her output strategy, while the followers
learned that they could then improve their profits by adapting to the new environment. The
resulting equilibrium is most simply modelled as the outcome of a Stackelberg game in which
the deviant is the leader who can commit, in this case to her output, and to which the followers
respond. As the aim is to demonstrate that mark-up equilibria are not robust to this more
sophisticated deviation, this section considers the simpler duopoly case ( = 2). The first step
reproduces the classic Cournot Stackelberg oligopoly. The leader can commit to her output level,
 before the other (the follower) makes his choice,  , so that the leader can optimize against
the follower’s reaction function (2). The resulting equilibrium has
 = (1 + 2)
2(1 + 4+ 22)   =
 ¡1 + 6+ 42¢
4(1 + )(1 + 4+ 22)  (13)
These expressions are somewhat opaque, but simplify in the constant returns case in which  = 0
to the familiar solution  = 2,  = 4 = , and the profit of the leader is 3216, larger
than the follower’s profit, who receives only one-third as much or 216, and also higher than
under the symmetric Nash Cournot equilibrium of 29. If  = 1, then  = 1256   =
5   = 1156 and the leader’s profit is 045% higher than in the symmetric duopoly.
5.1 Stackelberg quantity deviations from the mark-up equilibrium
The relevant question for studying the stability of agent-based learning is whether choosing the
optimal Nash mark-up is robust against a more sophisticated player who in a sequential setting
can stick to her optimal output while the other player continues to mark up on marginal cost but
learns the optimal mark-up (eﬀectively the correct position of his residual demand schedule).
The previous duopoly example demonstrates that mark-up behaviour it is not robust (in a
deterministic setting at least) against a Cournot (quantity-fixing) deviation and that is also the
case when the follower is choosing his mark-up. Thus if the leader commits to a quantity, ,
the follower chooses a mark-up  given the residual demand schedule  () = − − . The
follower’s supply schedule is given by (4) with  = 2 so market clearing yields
 = −  − −
2  or  =
+ 2(− )
1 + 2  (14)
The follower chooses  to maximize profit (see appendix) resulting in a reaction function
 = −
2 =

1 + 2
The leader’s optimal response (and the follower’s output) are exactly as in the Stackelberg
Cournot equilibrium (13) in which both agents choose quantities, as shown in Fig. 3.
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Stackelberg quantity vs mark-up equilibrium
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Proposition 4 If one player assumes that the strategy space is the choice of the mark-up on its
marginal cost, then with a quadratic cost function, linear demand and two identical players, the
other player will find it profitable to commit to choosing a (diﬀerent) optimal quantity to supply.
Proof. From equation (13)    Since the leader could have chosen the same output as
the follower but chose not to, she must be making higher profits.
5.2 Stackelberg quantity deviations from the slope mark-up equilibrium
If the leader oﬀers a fixed quantity  and the follower oﬀers the supply schedule (8),  = 2,
the market clearing price is
 = 2(− )
2 +  

 = −
(2 + )
 
The follower’s problem is to maximize  = 2(2− 2)4 for which the f.o.c. is
(2− 2) = (1− )(2 + )
 = 2
1 + 2 (15)
It may seem surprising that this does not depend on the leader’s choice, but the follower’s actual
mark-up will be lower the larger the output of the leader and hence the lower the price, which
gives the leader the advantage. The leader chooses  to maximize profit  = ()− 2 , given
that  = 2( − )(2 + ). The profit maximizing solution is again the Cournot Stackelberg
equilibrium (13).
15
Proposition 5 If one player assumes that the strategy space is the choice of the slope of its
oﬀer, then with a quadratic cost function, linear demand and two identical players, the other
player will find it profitable to commit to choosing a (diﬀerent) optimal quantity to supply.
Proof. From equation (13)    Since the leader could have chosen the same output as
the follower but chose not to, she must be making higher profits.
5.3 Stackelberg slope deviations from the mark-up equilibrium
If the leader chooses a slope supply schedule given by (8) with  = 2 and the follower chooses
his mark-up , the market clearing price is given by
 = − 
2
− −
2  or  =
2+
2+ 1 +  (16)
Fig 4 illustrates and the appendix demonstrates that this can be a profitable deviation, although
not as profitable as choosing output rather than slope when confronting mark-up followers.
Leader chooses slope vs follower choosing mark-up
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6 Conclusion
Agent-based models are attractive in attempting to model outcomes in complex markets where
some agents can act strategically, and there has been considerable interest in whether adaptive
or Q-learning will lead to Nash equilibria, as these would seem natural equilibrium concepts.
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However, as with all attempts to model strategic behaviour, the resulting equilibrium is sensitive
to the action space from which agents choose. Standard oligopoly models consider actions to
be either quantities (supplies to the market), as in the Cournot formulation, or prices oﬀered to
the market (the Bertrand assumption). In the presence of uncertain or varying demand, supply
function models, developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and applied to electricity markets by
Green and Newbery (1992), are attractive intermediate formulations, and their linear solutions9
have been influential in motivating the kind of agent-based models considered here.
All these specifications assume a unitary or owner-managed firm pursuing maximum profit
but under managerial capitalism the ultimate owners need to motivate managers. Ritz (2008)
argues that rewarding managers for increasing their market share is consistent with the evidence
and can be a useful in pursuing more collusive strategies. Ritz concludes that though competing
for market shares seems more aggressive, it is indeed more “robust” to strategic manipulations.
Following the same line, Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) study the strategic
distortion of preferences. These models compare diﬀerent proximate objective functions with the
same choice variable (and with the same goal of ultimately maximizing profits). In contrast, our
paper has the same ultimate objective function — profit maximization — but compares diﬀerent
choice variables.
While the choice of action space in optimizing models is normally guided by the market
structure and the actions that agents have, the choice of action space in agent-based models is
normally guided by tractability, where a choice of a single parameter (such as the mark-up over
marginal cost or the slope of the supply schedule) considerably simplifies the problem. This paper
has shown that the two mark-up strategies considered are more competitive than Nash-Cournot
behaviour in the linear supply and demand duopoly case, with the Nash choice of the optimal
slope of the oﬀers yielding lower prices than the Cournot duopoly prices but higher prices than
the optimum mark-up on linear marginal costs. While these mark-up equilibria are robust against
Nash deviations by single firms choosing quantities instead of mark-ups (so they are in that sense
Nash equilibria), they are not robust to either group deviations or to more sophisticated single
firm Stackelberg deviations in which the deviant maintains her output and the remaining players
adapt to that and find the corresponding mark-up equilibrium output levels. The deviant player
makes higher profits following this Cournot Stackelberg strategy (or the slope mark-up against
a fixed mark-up strategy), casting doubt on the robustness of Nash mark-up equilibria.
The implication of this finding for agent-based modelling is that it would be sensible to
9Supply function models typically have a continuum of solutions, one of which may be linear, providing there
are no relevant capacity constraints. Where capacity constraints are important, there may be unique but non-linear
solutions.
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test any resulting numerically found convergence results for robustness against diﬀerent choice
variables by one or more (large) agents, who would need to maintain their choice for suﬃciently
many iterations to induce responses by the remaining agents. A finding that the resulting
equilibria were close to the original solution would attest to its robustness, but if not the proposed
solution would remain suspect. We plan to explore such questions in simple and then more
complex agent-based modelling situations.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Deviations from competitive equilibrium
The supply function of each competitive firm  is given by  =  so residual demand is
 = − − (− 1) = − (+−1 ) The deviant firm  then maximizes profit, for which the
f.o.c. gives
 = 
1 + +   =
(1 + )
(1 + )2 − 12
  = 
1 +  
Note that the optimal output is the same as the Nash Cournot output give in (3). Profit for the
deviant is
 = 
2((1 + )2 + 2(1 + ) + 1)
2(1 + + )2((1 + )2 − 12)   =
2
2(1 + ) 
This last inequality can be demonstrated by subtracting competitive profit from deviant profit,
which, after simplification, has the sign of
(1 + + 1)2 ≥ 0
Thus, provided the competitive equilibrium has a positive price (i.e.   0), it is more
profitable to set quantity (or oﬀer whatever the market demands at the price  above) than to
act competitively. This is equivalent to observing that the competitive equilibrium here is not a
Nash equilibrium with finitely many firms.
7.2 Q-learning with a constant mark-up
If firm  sets mark-up  then the market clearing price, MCP, (m−) solves, after substi-
tuting  from (4),
 = −X  = (+P)(1 + )  so  = 1(1 + ) 
 = − so  =
1
(

 − 1)
The f.o.c. from maximizing profit w.r.t.  gives

 = (−MC)

 + 

 =

 (

 − 1) + 

 
=
−(1− 1 + )+ 
(1 + ) = 0 so  =

 (− 1 + )
 = − = (− 1 + )
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(1 + ) =  = (+ +
P
 6=)
(1 + ) 
(2(1 + )2 − 1) = +
X
 6=
 
The symmetric equilibrium has  = :
(2(1 + )2 − 1) = + (− 1)
((1 + )2 − 1) = 
7.3 Slope mark-up equilibrium
 = +P    = −2 
Diﬀerentiate the profit function (s−) = (s−)(s−) − 2 2 = 2( − 122 )
partially w.r.t.  to give
(2 − 2 ) = (1− )
2 − 2 = (+
X )(1− )
 = +
P
 6= 
1 + (+P 6= ) 
The symmetric equilibrium  =  solves
0 = (− 1)2 − (− − 2)− 
 = − − 2 + 
2(− 1)   =
p
(− 2)2 + 2(+ 2)
 = 
1 +  =
2(− 1)
(1 + )(− 2) +    =

(1 + ) 
Proof of Proposition 2 With a constant number of firms, if a firm’s output under the Nash
slope equilibrium is less than under the Nash mark-up output, then the price will be higher. The
sign of the diﬀerence between the Nash mark-up output and the Nash slope output is given by
Sign( − ) = Sign( 1 −
1
 ) ∝
(1 + )
 −
(1 + )2 − 1
1 + − 1

∝ (1 + )(1− )− 1
∝ 2(1 + )2(1− (1− ) 12 )− 2(− 1)
where  = (1+)√1−  and  = 4(−1)2(1+)2 . But by expansion, (1−(1−)
1
2 ) ≡   12 = 2(−1)2(1+)2 ,
so Sign( − )  0
21
The other part requires us to show that Sign( − )  0.
Sign(
1
 −
1
 ) ∝ 1 + (1 + )− −

 
∝ (1 + )− 
∝ (− 2− + )(1 + )− 2(− 1)
= (1− )− 2(1 + )− 2 + (1 + )(1 + )(1− ) 12 
= 2(− 1)− (1 + )(1 + )
= − 1−   0 where  = ( − 2)(1 + )
2(1 + )
2(− 1) 
Thus in the case of a symmetric oligopoly it is possible to rank the equilibrium prices    
. QED
7.4 Stackelberg quantity choice facing mark-up players
From (14),  = 1(1 + 2) and the follower maximizes profit  − 2 by his choice of 
as before, noting that  = (− 1)2 and − MC = , giving f.o.c

 = 

 + 

 = 0
 = − =
2
1−  =
−
2 
The leader’s optimal response is to choose  to maximize profit, −2 , where  = −− =
−  − (1 + 2), so
 = (− )(1 + 2)
2(1 + ) 
Then 2(1 + ) = (− )(1 + 2)− 2(1 + )2 , for which the f.o.c is
0 = (1 + 2)(− 2)− 4(1 + ) (17)
 = (1 + 2)
2(1 + 4+ 22)  (18)
2(1 + ) = (− )(1 + 2) = (1 + 2)(1− 1 + 2
2(1 + 4+ 22))
 = (1 + 2)(1 + 6+ 4
2)
4(1 + )(1 + 4+ 22) 
 = 
1 + 2 =
(1 + 6+ 42)
4(1 + )(1 + 4+ 22)  (19)
7.5 Stackelberg quantity deviations from the slope mark-up equilibrium
The leader’s profit is  =  − 2  so the f.o.c. for profit maximization is
− 2 +   = 0 where

 = −
2
2 + 
Substituting for  from (15) and rearranging gives (13).
22
7.6 Stackelberg slope deviations from the mark-up equilibrium
From (16),  = 1(1+ 2+ ) and the follower maximizes profit  − 2 by his choice of
 as before, noting that  = (− 1)2 and − MC = , giving f.o.c

 =

2(

 − 1) + 

 = 0
 =   =

1 + 2+  but
 = 2+
2+ 1 + 
so
 = 2(1 + 2+ )(2 + )(2 + 2+ ) 
The leader’s profit function is proportional to (2− 2)2 for which the f.o.c. can be written
 log 
 =
− 1
(2− )  but
 log 
 =

1 + 2+  −
1
2 +  −

2 + 2+ 
from which the optimal value of  can be determined. For example if  = 1,  = 100, the
symmetric slope equilibrium has  = √3−1 = 0732 and  = 211, but in this case the solution is
 = 07142 which is a slightly steeper slope. Instead of the symmetric price being √3 = 577,
the new price is 581 and the leader’s output is 207 profit 774 Had the leader accepted the
mark-up equilibrium, the price would have been 571, the output 214 and profit 765, which is
less. If the leader had chosen output rather than slope the equilibrium price would have been
589, quantity 214 and profit 800, higher than choosing the slope.
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